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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Appellant/Petitioner,

:

v.

:

DONALD L. JAEGER,

:

Appellee/Respondent.

:

Case No.
Court of Appeals 910132-CA
Priority No. 13

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The question presented for review in point 2 of the

State's Petition is whether the Court of Appeals properly concluded
that it did not have jurisdiction to review the magistrate's refusal
to bind over this case based on this Court's decision in State v.
Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991).
Response:

The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that it

did not have jurisdiction to review the magistrate's refusal to bind
over the case. A magistrate does not adjudicate nor issue a final
appealable order when he or she presides over a preliminary
hearing.

In addition, the State does not have statutory

authorization for such an appeal.
2.

The first question presented for review by the State

is whether the Court of Appeals effectively denied the State an
avenue for review of the magistrate's order denying bindover.

A

related issue addressed by the State in this first question is
whether the Court of Appeals determined the method for review of a
magistrate's dismissal where the State believes that it does not

have adequate evidence to refile the case pursuant to State v.
Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986), thereby deciding an
important issue of state law which should be decided by this Court.
Response:

This Court should deny certiorari since the

Court of Appeals correctly applied statutes and case law from this
Court in reaching its decision that it did not have jurisdiction
over the State's appeal of the magistrate's refusal to bind over the
case.

Regardless of whether the State has historically had a right

to review of a magistrate's refusal to bind over a charge, the
current statutory scheme does not provide for appellate review.

The

State offers no current analysis which would support appellate
review of a magistrate's decision; nor does it suggest what
procedures might be appropriate.

An erroneous decision is the

proper basis for certiorari; outlining for the State the procedure
it could utilize in this case is not an appropriate basis for a writ
of certiorari.
3.

The third issue presented by the State is whether this

Court should grant certiorari based on the failure of the Court of
Appeals to address the merits of the case and outline the
appropriate standard to be utilized in assessing whether to bind
over a charge.
Response;

Because the State does not have the power to

appeal the magistrate's determination and the Court of Appeals did
not have jurisdiction to review such determination, it would be
inappropriate to address the merits of the State's argument.
addition, since the magistrate utilized the proper standard in
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In

reaching his determination that the State had not established
probable cause to believe Appellee had committed a crime, a writ of
certiorari should not be granted in this case.
4.

The fourth issue presented for review by the State is

whether the Court of Appeals followed the Rules of Appellate
Procedure in issuing a per curiam unpublished opinion in this case.
Response;

The Court of Appeals followed the Rules of

Appellate Procedure in this case; this is not an appropriate basis
for a writ of certiorari.

OPINION BELOW
The amended opinion of the Court of Appeals was issued on
January 7, 1992. A copy of State v. Jaeger, Case No. 910132-CA
(Utah App. January 7, 1992) is contained in Addendum A.

The opinion

is not published.
The State did not file a petition for rehearing in the
Court of Appeals.

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of relevant constitutional provisions, statutes
and rules is set forth in Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information dated November 1, 1990, the State charged
Donald Jaeger, Defendant/Appellee/Respondent with Criminal Homicide,
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Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree felony, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990).

R. 1-2.

On January 9, 1991, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings,
acting as a magistrate pursuant to Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure (1991), conducted a preliminary hearing in the present
case.

R. 17-19. After taking the matter under advisement, the

magistrate issued a Memorandum Decision on February 1, 1991, in
which he refused to bind over the case for trial.

R. 18-20; see

Addendum C for copy of magistrate's Memorandum Decision.
On February 6, 1991, the magistrate dismissed the charges
against Mr. Jaeger.

R. 39-40. As of the date of this brief, the

State has not attempted to refile the charge pursuant to Rule 7,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On February 28, 1991, the State filed its notice of appeal,
designating the Utah Supreme Court as the appellate court with
jurisdiction over this matter.

R. 44.

On March 8, 1991, this Court

informed the Attorney General's office that the appeal in the
instant case had been filed in the Court of Appeals.

R. 46.

Thereafter, on March 20, 1991, the State informed this Court that it
believed that the case belonged in the Court of Appeals.

R. 48.

On December 18, 1991, after both parties had filed briefs
in the Court of Appeals, this Court issued its opinion in State v.
Humphrey, et a h . 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991).

On December 20, 1991,

Appellee filed a letter of supplemental authority in the Court of
Appeals citing Humphrey in support of his argument contained in
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Point I of his brief that the Court of Appeals did not have
jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
On December 20, 1991, Appellee also filed a motion, which
was stipulated to by the State, for supplemental briefing in light
of this Court's decision in State v. Humphrey.

That stipulated

motion also requested that oral argument be stricken until after
such supplemental briefing occurred.
On January 3, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued its
per curiam decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The opinion indicated that oral argument was stricken and remanded
the case to the district court.

Four days later, the Court of

Appeals issued an amended opinion remanding the case to the circuit
court.

A copy of this amended opinion is in Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts of the incident are not relevant since the Court
of Appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction over this appeal
by the State.
However, in the event this Court disagrees, and for the
purposes of this Opposition to the State's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, the Statement of Facts contained in the magistrate's
Memorandum Decision is adequate.

See Memorandum Decision at R. 21-7

contained in Addendum C.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT OF APPEALS FOLLOWED CASE IAW
FROM THIS COURT AND CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT IT DID
NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL.
In State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991), this Court
held that district courts, not appellate courts, have jurisdiction
over a criminal defendant's motion to quash a magistrate's
bindover.

In reaching that decision, this Court relied on the

distinction between courts of record, circuit courts, and
magistrates, and pointed out that "magistrates are not courts of
record when they conduct preliminary hearings and issue bindover
orders" and "their orders are not immediately appealable."

Id. at

468.
This Court stated:
Magistrates are not courts or tribunals. They
exercise magisterial, not adjudicatory,
functions. Review of their orders cannot
properly be subjected to appellate review under
our statutory scheme.
Id. at 468 (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals properly relied on this analysis in
Humphrey that magistrates do not adjudicate final appealable orders
after a preliminary hearing in reaching its decision that it did not
have jurisdiction to review Judge Hutchings# refusal to bind over
the case.
A review of Utah statutes and Rules of Criminal Procedure
also supports the determination that the State cannot appeal a
magistrate's refusal to bind over a criminal defendant.
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Utah Code

Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (Supp. 1991) 1 lists the circumstances under which
the State can appeal.
It is well established that § 77-18a-l(2) creates "a narrow
category of cases in which the prosecution may appeal" and that the
circumstances under which the State can appeal are strictly
limited.

See State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App. 1990);

State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d 223, 224 (Utah 1985); Hartman v.
Weggeland, 429 P.2d 978 (Utah 1967); State v. Kelbach. 569 P.2d
1100, 1101 (Utah 1977); State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1065
(Utah 1983); State v. Workman. 806 P.2d 1198, 1201-2 (Utah App.
1991) .
In its opening brief in the Court of Appeals, the State
relied only on Rule 26(3)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as
creating for the State the ability to appeal in this case.

That

provision is identical to § 77-18a-l(2)(a), and provides that the
State can appeal from a "final judgment of dismissal."2
A dismissal following a refusal to bind over a defendant
for trial is not a "final judgment of dismissal" since it is not a
final appealable order and the State can refile the Information
pursuant to Rule 7(8)(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

See

State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986)("[A]n accused is not
placed in jeopardy at [a preliminary hearing], and the double

1. Aside from punctuation, § 77-18a-l(2) is identical to
Rule 26(3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1991).
2. The State does not suggest any other statutory basis for its
ability to appeal in its petition for writ of certiorari.
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jeopardy provisions of the federal and state constitutions do not
apply.");

State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468 (magistrate does not

adjudicate and does not issue final appealable order after
preliminary hearing).
In addition, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3 and 78-2-2 (Supp.
1991), which delineate the jurisdiction of this Court and the Court
of Appeals, buttress Mr. Jaeger's position that an appeal is not
appropriate in this case.

In its opening brief, the State relied on

§ 78-2a-3(2)(d) in providing jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals.
That subsection gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over
"appeals from circuit courts . . . ." However, Humphrey clarifies
that a magistrate presiding over a preliminary hearing is not a
"circuit court."

Furthermore, reliance on this provision for

jurisdiction would create inconsistent appellate jurisdiction for
the same charge based on whether a justice of the peace or circuit,
district or appellate court judge were acting as magistrate.
In its petition for writ of certiorari, the State also
refers, without any analysis, to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j),
which is a catchall provision which provides jurisdiction to this
Court over "orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction."

State v. Humphrey also clarifies that a magistrate

presiding over a preliminary hearing is not a "court of record," so
this section fails to provide jurisdiction to this Court.
The lack of any provision in § 78-2-2 or § 78-2a-3
providing jurisdiction to an appellate court over an appeal from a

8

magistrate's dismissal further demonstrates that the decision of the
Court of Appeals that it did not have jurisdiction over the case was
proper.
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals was proper and
the State has provided this Court with no arguable basis for
creating a right to appeal or delineating jurisdiction of such an
appeal in either appellate court, this Court should deny the State's
petition for writ of certiorari.

POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS NOT REQUIRED
TO INFORM THE STATE AS TO HOW TO PROCEED IN THIS
CASE; CLARIFYING AVAILABLE PROCEDURE FOR THE
STATE IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI.
Although the State claims a historical right to review of a
magistrate's refusal to bind a case over for trial, it fails to
point to any current statutes which create such a right.
A historical right is meaningless in the absence of statutes or
rules of procedure which allow the State to take an appeal.
In addition, it is not clear that a historical right to
appeal a magistrate's refusal to bind over a defendant existed.
Former section 77-39-4 permitted the State to appeal from a
"judgment of dismissal."

While a State could appeal a district

court judge's order granting a motion to quash, such an appeal is
distinct from an appeal of a magistrate's refusal to bind over.
While case law from other jurisdictions may be informative,
it does not provide the State with the basis for an appeal in the
absence of any statutory provisions authorizing an appeal.
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Most of

the cases cited by the State at 10-12 of its petition for writ of
certiorari involve a distinct statutory scheme from that in Utah.
See, e.g.. People v. Mimms. 251 Cal. Rptr. 672, 673 (Cal. App. 5
Dist. 1988)(statute explicitly authorizes state to appeal from
dismissal where jeopardy has not attached);

State v. Antes, 246

N.W. 2d 671 (Wis. 1976)(statute authorizes state to appeal dismissal
where jeopardy has not attached); State ex. rel. Fallis v. Caldwell.
498 P.2d 426 (Okl. Cr. 1972)(court recognizes that statutes and
rules do not allow state to appeal and adopts prospective rule
allowing state to appeal from magistrate's adverse ruling); State v.
Zimmerman. 660 P.2d 960, 962 (Kan. 1983)(district court presides
over preliminary hearing; statute explicitly authorizes appeal from
an order dismissing information); State v. Fry. 385 N.W.2d 196 (Wis.
App. 1985)(circuit court hears preliminary hearing; court allows
state to appeal without any statutory analysis).
Other cases cited by the State on pages 10-12 of its
petition discuss the appropriateness of refiling, allow a review
other than an appeal to an appellate court, or simply do not allow
the State to a review of the refusal to bind over.

State v. Ruiz.

678 P.2d 1109 (Idaho 1984)(no appeal allowed); Walker v. Schneider.
477 N.W.2d 167, 174-5 (N.D. 1991)(following adverse ruling on
probable cause at preliminary hearing, state may "(1) seek district
court review of a magistrate's adverse ruling on probable cause,
[footnote omitted] or (2) issue a new complaint upon the offer of
additional evidence or good cause[]" (emphasis added); People v.
Nevitt, 256 N.W.2d 612, 613 (Mich. App. 1977)(prosecutor refiled

- 10 -

after dismissal and defendant bound over; court says better practice
would have been to "appeal to the circuit court."

(emphasis added).

The remainder of the cases cited by the State on pages
10-12 of its petition involve distinct circumstances from those in
the present case.

See, e.g., Comm. v. Finn, 496 A.2d 1254, 1255

(Pa. Super. 1985)(dismissal was final appealable order because
statute of limitations had run and state could not refile); Comm. v.
Prado, 393 A.2d 8, 10 (Pa. 1978)(although state usually cannot
appeal discharge after preliminary hearing, where only judge
empowered to do so refused to grant petition for rearrest, appeal by
state of orders discharging defendant and refusal to rearrest
proper).
Other jurisdictions have held that under their statutory
schemes, the decision of the magistrate to dismiss the information
is not a final order from which the state can appeal.

See, e.g.,

State v. Maki, 192 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. 1971)(no appellate review;
,f

[a]n appellate court should not be required to review the issue of

probable cause in every preliminary examination before the
magistrate . . . " ) ; State v. Fahey, 275 N.W 2d 870 (S.D. 1979)
(preliminary hearing is not final adjudication).
While it is understandable that the State might desire
further guidance at this juncture, the Court of Appeals was not
required to outline available procedure for the State, especially in
a case such as this, where it did not have jurisdiction over an
appeal.

The State has failed to offer this Court any suggestions as

to which statutes might control or which avenues of review might be
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available.

Instead, the State has claimed only that a historical

right to review existed and cited to cases from other jurisdictions
which rely on their own statutes and rules to create either a right
to refile, district court review, appellate review, or no review at
all.
Given that the decision of the Court of Appeals was
mandated by this Court's decision in Humphrey and the State has
offered no statutory, rule or case law basis for a different
decision, certiorari is not appropriate in this case.

POINT III. ALTHOUGH THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW
THE MERITS OF THIS CASE. EVEN IF IT DID. IT WOULD
FIND THAT THE MAGISTRATE UTILIZED THE PROPER
STANDARD IN DETERMINING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE DID
NOT EXIST.
As set forth in Point I, supra. the Court of Appeals
properly held that it did not have jurisdiction over this appeal?
therefore, it would be improper for the Court of Appeals or this
Court to explore the merits of the State's argument.
However, in the event this Court determines otherwise, it
is nevertheless appropriate to deny a writ of certiorari since the
magistrate applied the proper standard in determining that there was
not probable cause to bind Mr. Jaeger over for trial.
Although the State would like the standard at a preliminary
hearing to be that the magistrate look at the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State and not assess the credibility of the
witnesses or make factual findings, such a position disregards
Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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It also disregards the

important role of a preliminary hearing in Utah# as reflected in
Article 1, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution and case law, and the
purpose and function of a preliminary hearing in Utah, as set forth
in State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980).
Rule 7 requires that the magistrate make factual findings,
allows cross-examination of the witnesses, and allows the defendant
to testify and call witnesses.

The provisions of the rule would be

meaningless if the State's position were adopted.
Article I, Section 13 of the Utah constitution and various
cases emphasize the importance of a preliminary hearing in Utah.
See State v. Pay, 146 P. 300, 305 (Utah 1915)(the right to a
preliminary hearing in Utah is a "substantial one"); State v.
Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Utah 1988)(importance of preliminary
hearing and its purposes "have made up the fabric of our law for
over three-quarters of a century"); State v. Jensen, 96 P. 1085,
1086 (Utah 1908).
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d at 786, acknowledges the
critical and important character of preliminary hearings in this
state, recognizing that the right to confrontation exists at such
hearings.

This Court stated in Anderson, "the credibility of the

witnesses is an important element in the determination of probable
cause."

Id.
In Anderson, this Court relied on Mvers v. Commonwealth,

363 Mass. 843, 29 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1973) in reaching its decision.
In Myersf the court pointed out that cross-examination "may expose
fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may lead the magistrate to

- 13 -

refuse to bind the accused over."

Id. at 822-3.

The Myers court

also pointed out that the credibility of the witnesses is a factual
assessment to be made by the magistrate, that

lf

[t]he magistrate is

not bound to believe even uncontradicted testimony of a particular
witness, and that the magistrate can assess the quality of the
evidence in addition to determining the credibility of the
witnesses."

Id. at 825.

The probable cause showing required at a preliminary
hearing is greater than the probable cause determination which is
required for an arrest warrant, and requires at the very least that
the state "establish a prima facie case against the defendant from
which the trier of fact could conclude the defendant was guilty of
the offense as charged.

[footnote omitted]."

State v. Anderson,

612 P.2d at 783.3
Although the magistrates thorough Memorandum Decision
speaks best for itself (see Addendum C), a brief overview may help
this Court in determining that the proper standard was utilized.
The magistrate essentially made the following findings:

(a) the

gunshot residue (GSR) evidence was not reliable so as to link Don to
the firing of the gun (Memorandum Decision 29-30) , (b) the GSR tests
were not reliable so as to establish sufficient cause to believe
Mary did not fire the gun (Memorandum Decision at 31-2), and (c) the

3. In State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah App. 1992), this
Court applied a standard similar to that utilized by the magistrate
in the instant case, and held that the State had not established a
prima facie case against the defendant. In order to establish a
prima facie case, the State must produce "believable evidence of all
the elements of the crime charged." State v. Emmett. slip op. at 3.
- 14 -

remaining evidence did not establish sufficient cause to believe a
crime had been committed.
These findings are supported by the evidence and are not
clearly erroneous.

The magistrate also made subsidiary findings in

regard to his finding that the evidence was not reliable so as to
establish sufficient cause to believe Mary did not fire the gun.
These subsidiary findings included:
a. not all of the particles taken from
Mary's hands were analyzed (R. 30),
b. lack of gunshot residue is not conclusive
that Mary did not fire gun (R. 31),
c. Any GSR on Mary's hands may well have
rubbed off by bags or medical personnel. (R. 31)
d. Had Mary fired the gun, it would not
have exuded a sufficient amount of GSR on her
hands to be detectable. (R. 31)
These subsidiary findings are supported by the evidence in
this case and are not clearly erroneous.
The magistrate assessed the quality of the State's
evidence, including the 911 tape recording and testimony of
witnesses, and determined that there was not sufficient cause to
believe a homicide had been committed in this case.

He issued a

thorough and well considered memorandum outlining the basis for his
decision.

This type of thorough reasoned approach to the issue of

whether to bind a defendant over for trial should be encouraged by
this Court.
Because this Court does not have jurisdiction over an
appeal by the State in this case and based on the magistrate's
thorough and correct application of the proper standard, this Court
should deny certiorari on this issue.
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POINT IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS FOLLOWED
APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
Although the State maintains that this Court should review
this case because the Court of Appeals failed to follow the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, a review of those rules indicates otherwise.
The State claims that Rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure "contemplates that summary reversal of a case should only
be invoked when the parties have had an opportunity to respond to
such a drastic procedure."

State's brief at 19.

However, the

State's claim that, under the rules, it was entitled to notice and
an opportunity to respond fails for several reasons.
First, the Court of Appeals did not summarily reverse a
case.

Instead, it determined that it did not have jurisdiction,

which resulted in the magistrate's ruling being undisturbed.
Second, Rule 10(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows
an appellate court to dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction
"upon its own motion, and on such notice as it directs."

This

language suggests that notice and an opportunity to respond is
within the discretion of the appellate court.
Third, Rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows the
appellate court to suspend the rules "[i]n the interest of
expediting a decision."

Even if Rule 10 required that the parties

be given notice and an opportunity to respond to a court's
sua sponte motion for summary disposition, that provision could be
properly suspended under Rule 2.

- 16 -

In this case, Appellee argued that the State did not have
the ability to appeal the magistrate's ruling in Point I of his
brief in the Court of Appeals.

The State was therefore aware that

jurisdiction was at issue in this case.

After this Court issued its

opinion in Humphrey, Appellee cited that decision as supplemental
authority in support of his argument that the Court of Appeals did
not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal and requested the
opportunity for further briefing in light of Humphrey.
Unusual circumstances existed in this case where a decision
of this Court, which directly impacted on the Court of Appeals
determination of jurisdiction and overruled an existing Court of
Appeals decision, was issued after parties had filed their briefs.
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals followed
the Rules of Appellate Procedure and expedited a decision which was
mandated by this Court's decision in Humphrey.4
The State also expresses concern about the use of an
unpublished per curiam decision.

An appellate court has the

discretion to utilize per curiam decisions.

In the past, this Court

has issued per curiam opinions, even in areas where it was breaking
new ground.

See, e.g., State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987).

The appellate court also has the discretion as to whether
to publish an opinion.

While a published opinion might have been

helpful to practitioners, especially criminal defense lawyers who

4. It should be noted that the State has no constitutional right to
appeal, and its statutory right to appeal is strictly limited. See
discussion supra at 7-8. Hence, the State does not have an argument
that its "rights" were violated by this procedure.
- 17 -

might be faced with defending an appeal by the State from a
magistrate's dismissal, the holding of the Jaeger decision is
apparent from a reading of Humphrey which clarifies that magistrates
do not issue final appealable orders.
The Court of Appeals was not required to publish this
opinion, and the procedure utilized by the Court of Appeals should
not be a basis for granting a writ of certiorari in this case.

CONCLUSION
Appellee/Respondent Donald Jaeger respectfully requests
that this Court deny the State's petition for writ of certiorari on
all issues.

SUBMITTED this lfr&> day of May, 1992.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

LISA jjREMAL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

RICHARD MAURO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on appellee's motion and
stipulation for supplemental briefing and to strike oral
argument.
Defendant was charged with second degree murder and a
preliminary hearing was held. The court dismissed the
information on the ground that the State failed to establish
probable cause to bind over defendant to district court for
trial. The State appeals.
In State v. Humphrey, No. 900434 (Utah December 18, 1991),
the Utah Supreme Court held that jurisdiction to review bindover
orders rests with the district court, not with the Utah Court of
Appeals. The court stated that when a bindover order is issued,
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whether there is sufficient evidence to bind defendant over for
trial. If so, the information is then transferred to the
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jurisdiction of the matter- The district court then "has the
inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its
original jurisdiction has been properly invoked." id. Further,
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure gives the
district courts authority to review defects in the indictment or
information.
In this case, the State appeals from the circuit court's
dismissal of an information, alleging defendant should have been
bound over to district court for trial. In accordance with
Humphrey. we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
remand to the circuit court. Because we dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, oral argument is stricken and the motion
for supplemental briefing is deemed moot.

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

Russel^W. Bench, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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ADDENDUM B

TEXT OF STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or
indictment—Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be
prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by
information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate, unless the examination be waived by
the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and
commitment. The formation of the grand jury and
the powers and duties thereof shall be as
prescribed by the Legislature. (As amended
November 2, 1948, effective January 1, 1949.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-18a-l(2) (Supp. 1991) provides in
pertinent part:
77-l8a-l.

Appeals—when proper.

(2) an appeal may be taken by the
prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the
prosecution because of a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a
statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a
pretrial motion to suppress evidence when
upon a petition for review the appellate
court decides that the appeal would be in
the interest of justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or
no contest.

Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2 (Supp. 1991) provides:
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction to answer questions of state law
certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
authority to issue all writs and process
necessary to carry into effect its orders,
judgments, and decrees or in aid of its
jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme
Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final
judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial
Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal
adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and
Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and
Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the
district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any
court of record holding a statute of the
United States or this state unconstitutional
on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any
court of record involving a charge of a
first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court
involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of
any court of record over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction.

(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the
Court of Appeals any of the matters over which
the Supreme Court has original appellate
j urisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an
appeal of an interlocutory order of a court
of record involving a charge of a capital
felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election
districts;
(d) retention or removal of public
officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in
Subsection (3)(a) through (f).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion
in granting or denying a petition for writ of
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals
adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review
those cases certified to it by the Court of
Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its
review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1991) provides:
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all
writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments,
orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees
resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals
from the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies,
except the Public Service Commission, State
Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state
engineer;

(b) appeals from the district court
review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of
agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action
under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts,
except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any
court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a charge of a first degree
or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital
felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions
for extraordinary writs sought by persons
who are incarcerated or serving any other
criminal sentence, except petitions
constituting a challenge to a conviction of
or the sentence for a first degree or
capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court
involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody,
support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military
Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of
Appeals from the Supreme Court,
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own
motion only and by the vote of four judges of the
court may certify to the Supreme Court for
original appellate review and determination any
matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with
the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its
review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1991) provides:
Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate.
(8) (a) A preliminary examination shall be
held under the rules and laws applicable to
criminal cases tried before a court. The
state has the burden of proof and shall
proceed first with its case. At the
conclusion of the state's case, the
defendant may testify under oath, call
witnesses, and present evidence. The
defendant may also cross-examine the
witnesses against him.
(b) If from the evidence a magistrate
finds probable cause to believe that the
crime charged has been committed and that
the defendant has committed it, the
magistrate shall order in writing, that the
defendant be bound over to answer in the
district court. The findings of probable
cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in
part. Objections to evidence on the ground
that it was acquired by unlawful means are
not properly raised at the preliminary
examination.
(c) If the magistrate does not find
probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed or that the
defendant committed it, the magistrate shall
dismiss the information and discharge the
defendant. The magistrate may enter
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an
order of dismissal. The dismissal and
discharge do not preclude the state from
instituting a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense.

Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1991) provides:
Rule 26. Appeals.
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the
clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken
a notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment
appealed from, and by serving a copy of it on the
adverse party or his attorney of record. Proof
of service of the copy shall be filed with the
court.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant
from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction,
whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made, after judgment,
affecting the substantial rights of the
defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon
petition for review, the appellate court
decides that the appeal would be in the
interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the
defendant by reason of a mental disease or
defect incompetent to proceed further in a
pending prosecution.
(3) An appeal may be taken by the
prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the
prosecution because of a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a
statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a
pretrial motion to suppress evidence when,
upon a petition for review, the appellate
court decides that the appeal would be in
the interest of justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or
no contest.
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

;>

vs.
DONALD L. JAEGER,
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JUDGE MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS
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On January 9, 1991 at the hour of 2:00 p.m. the court, Judge
Michael L. Hutchings presiding, heard evidence presented by the
State and also by the defense in the above entitled case. The
defendant, Donald L. Jaeger, is charged with criminal homicide,
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony which allegedly
occurred at 6495 South Scranton Drive in Salt Lake County.

On the

date of August 22, 1990. The State was represented by Ernie Jones
and Kim Hornack.
Richard Mauro.

The defense was represented by Lisa Remal and
The court commends counsel for the defense and

the prosecution for the manner in which the evidence at the
preliminary hearing was presented.
The court has taken the case under advisement and now issues
its Memorandum Decision.
The court will state the question presented, a summary of the
facts presented at the preliminary hearing, cite the legal
standard to be applied at a preliminary hearing, analyze the facts
with the law and announce it's decision in this Memorandum Decision

QUESTION
Did the defendant, Donald Jaeger, inflict the fatal gunshot
wound that caused the death of Mary Barndt?
FACTS
Mary Barndt was a 19 year old female, living with the
defendant, Donald Jaeger, at 6495 South Scranton Drive in West
Jordan, Utah.

On August 22, 1990, the defendant, Donald Jaeger,

arrived from work at the residence at 7:30 p.m.
home.

Mary was not

The defendant opened some mail that had been delivered in

the mail box and discovered a telephone bill with some long
distance phone calls.

He suspected that Mary had made some

unauthorized phone calls.

The defendant called the phone numbers

to find out the purpose of the phone calls and to verify who had
made them.
The defendant also found Mary's young daughter, Alicia, home
unsupervised.

The defendant attempted to determine where Mary

might be located.
Clark.

He called, at least twice, Maryfs mother, Judy

During one of the conversations, Judy Clark was informed

that Mary "was heavy into drugs."

Judy Clark did not know Maryfs

whereabouts.
Later in the evening, Mary contacted the defendant by
telephone.

The defendant did not know where Mary was when she

called but he could hear some music in the background.

He assumed

that she had called from a bar or a party.
At approximately 12:00 midnight, Mary came home.
defendant was awakened when Mary came to bed.

The

At that time, the

defendant told her that his relationship with her was terminated
and that she should move out of the home the next day.
The defendant made another telephone call to Judy Clark. The
defendant first spoke with Judy Clark and indicated that Mary
would like to speak with her.
Mary.

Ms. Clark thereupon spoke with

Mary was crying and despondent.

Mary stated that Don had

asked her to leave the home and that the relationship was over.
She stated "Don hates me...yes he does, he hates me."
these statements approximately six times.
employment situation was not good.

She made

She also said, her

Finally she said, "I feel that

I need to get away from things and work things out."
The defendant indicated in conversations with the police
officers that he went back to sleep and was awakened by the
discharge of a firearm.

He immediately rushed into the kitchen

whereupon he saw Mary lying on her back.

The firearm was on the

floor between her legs near her ankles. Mary had sustained a
gunshot wound in her lower left neck near the collarbone.
The defendant called 911 emergency and spoke with the 911
operator for the city of West Jordan.

Near the beginning of his

911 conversation he stated, "Oh,...1.•.1...my girlfriend just shot
herself."

He also stated during this conversation, "Oh, God I

can't believe she done this." (sic.) "What can I do to help her?",
"I can't calm down but my girlfriend just shot herself.", "I love
you, I love you Mary.. .breath.. .breath.. .Baby, come on." and also
in speaking directly to her, "How could you do this?"

During the

911 conversation, the operator told him, among other things, to
hold the hand of Mary Barndt and also told him to turn Mary Barndt
on her side.

Officer B. Sundquist, from the West Jordan Police Department,
was first to arrive on the scene.

When he entered the residence,

he noticed Mary on her back on the kitchen floor with the gun at
her feet.

The barrel was pointed towards Mary Barndt.

had been shot from the .22 caliber automatic pistol.

One bullet

One expended

cartridge was lying on the ground between Mary Barndt's legs near
her ankles.

Officer Sundquist noticed some of Mary's upper

clothing near her side on the floor.

Officer Sundquist noticed

no evidence of disruption in the house.

He immediately put two

small brown paper bags over Mary's two hands and taped them.

His

purpose in doing so was to preserve any gun shot residue which may
possibly of been on her hands.

Paramedics arrived and took Mary

out of the residence to be transported to the hospital.

Her arms

were moving about as she was taken down the stairs of the split
level home.
Officer Sundquist performed a gun shot residue test at the
hospital at approximately 1:45 p.m.

The scene was hectic. Many

medical personnel were working to preserve Mary's life.

Mary's

left breast was cut, chest tubes were placed within her, I.V.fs
were administered and she was given many medical treatments. The
bags which were placed over Mary's hands were removed by the law
enforcement officers and were never preserved.

Therefore no tests

were performed on the inside of the bags to ascertain the presence
of gun shot residue.
Officer Sundquist performed a gunshot residue test on Mary's
left hand.

He had never performed a gunshot residue test before.

Officer Peterson performed a gunshot residue test on Mary's right

hand.

Officer Vernon Peterson had performed three or four prior

gunshot residue tests on various occasions before this particular
test.
Officer Vernon Peterson also conducted gunshot residue tests
on both hands of the defendant.

He performed the gunshot residue

test between 1:22 a.m. to 1:27 a.m.
of Donald Jaeger.

He noticed blood on the hands

Donald Jaeger also indicated that he had

touched Mary's gunshot wound.
Later, Judy Clark was informed that her daughter had died.
Her first comment was to ask if Mary had taken her own life.
Dr. Edward A. Leis, the Assistant State Medical Examiner,
testified that when the shot entered Mary's body, her left arm was
raised at least to shoulder height.

He formed this opinion

because of the passage way created by the bullet as it went
through the muscle and bone of Mary's left lower neck.

He

indicated the gunshot wound was clearly within the reach of Mary's
arms.

He determined that the barrel of the gun was approximately

nine inches away from Mary when the fatal shot was fired.

The

firearm was also positioned near Mary's right breast and was fired
into her upper left collarbone area of her lower left neck. A
mannequin was introduced into * evidence to demonstrate the location
of the fatal wound, the distance of the gun from the wound (a nine
inch yellow tape was attached to the mannequin), the trajectory of
the fatal shot and Mary's left arm raised at the time the fatal
shot was fired.
Dr. Leis also indicated that blood was found on Mary's hands
when she was brought into the State Medical Examiner's office.

Blood alcohol and drug screen tests were also conducted at
the State Medical Examiner's office.
had between .10 and .12 percent

At the time of death, Mary

alcohol in her system.

A drug

screen test also indicated the presence of Valium (diazapam) and
the metabolite of Valium.

Dr. Leis indicated this drug and its

coflibination with alcohol would cause someone to be tired and slow
and that Valium would heighten the effect of the alcohol.
Dr. Leis also indicated that the arm length of the victim was
26 1/2 inches and that it would be extremely unlikely that she
would have been able to shoot herself by holding the handgun by
the right hand with her right index finger on the trigger.

He

also indicated, however, that it would have been possible for Mary
to self inflict a gunshot by holding the gun facing her left
upperchest with her right hand and pulling the trigger with her
right thumb.
Dr. Leis expressed the opinion that Mary did not self-inflict
the gunshot.

He based the opinion on the facts of her left arm

being raised, gunshot residue test results on her hands, the
atypical entrance wound, the distance of the firearm from Mary's
body and angle of fire.
Kevin Smith, a criminologist working for the State Crime Lab,
testified.

He stated he tested the gunshot residue tests

performed on both Mary Barndt's hands and found no gunshot residue
on either test.

He stated that it was possible that Mary had

gunshot residue on her hands because he did not analyze all of the
particles submitted to him on the test discs.

He also stated that

a lack of gunshot residue should not be conclusive that Mary did
not fire the gun.

He also tes-^fied that he analyzed gunshot residue test
samples taken from both hands of Donald Jaeger.

He indicated that

he found particles "characteristic" of gunshot residue on both
samples.

He testified that there are three particles he is

looking for when performing a gunshot residue test.
particles are:

lead, barium, and antimony.

These three

He indicated that he

would look for spherical particles containing lead, plus the
substance of barium or the substance of antimony.

In the tests

conducted on the samples taken from Donald Jaeger's hands, he
found only two elements.

His conclusion was that he found

elements "characteristic" of gunshot residue but not "unique."

A

finding of "unique" would require the discovery of all three
substances taken in the gunshot residue test.
The test samples were also taken from the defendant's
workplace.

The defendant works for a company called "Western

Battery" where he overhauls generators and alternators.
"Characteristic" samples of particles were taken from four
locations at Western Battery, including Mr. Jaeger's wrenches, the
"vice," the defendant's toolbox and also the "book area."
Kevin Smith performed tests upon the samples taken at
"Western Battery" and found one spherical particle to be "unique"
(i.e. wherein all three elements~were~found) and a limited number
of spherical particles to be "characteristic" (i.e. where two of
three elements were found) of gunshot residue.

The defendant,

therefore, at the time of the shooting was working in an
environment where particles characteristic and unique of gunshot
residue were prevalent.

James Gaskill, an Assistant Professor at Weber State College
Crime Lab, testified.

He stated that it would take only two

pounds of pressure to pull the trigger on the firearm.
firearm was characterized as having a "hair trigger.11

The
Professor

Gaskill also tested the level of gunshot residue coming onto the
hands of the shooter of the firearm.

Gunshot residue tests were

performed on the hands of persons firing the .22 caliber pistol
with the same ammunition used in the fatal shot.

The tests were

performed with holding the gun in the right hand pulling the
trigger with the right index finger.

Particles "unique" to

gunshot residue were found on the hand of each person shooting the
pistol.
Professor Gaskill also indicated that the gun is a relatively
"clean gun" meaning that it did not exude very much gunshot
residue when compared with other handguns.

He indicated that

semi-automatic firearms have fewer openings than revolvers and
given the fact that the firearm in this case is a .22 caliber
firearm, that not much gunshot residue would exude from the
firearm when it was fired.
No evidence of fingerprint testing of the gun was presented
at the preliminary hearing to assist the court in determining who
fired the fatal shot.
LEGAL STANDARD TO APPLY AT A PRELIMINARY HEARING
Rule 7 (8) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs
preliminary hearings.

That rule requires that a magistrate must

find "probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been

committed and that the defendant has committed it,"

The Utah

Supreme Court has defined "probable cause" for purposes of
preliminary hearings in the case of State v. Anderson. 612 P.2d
778 (Utah 1980).

In Anderson, the court stated "...the probable

cause showing at the preliminary examination must establish a
prima facie case against the defendant from which the trier of
fact could conclude the defendant was guilty of the offense as
charged."

The court cited with approval a Massachusetts case,

Mvers v. Commonwealth. 363 Mass. 843, 298 N.E. 2d 819 (1973)
wherein the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted a
"directed verdict" rule in defining the minimum quantum of
evidence necessary to fulfill the probable cause requirement at
the preliminary examination.

The Supreme

Judicial Court of

Massachusetts stated "the magistrate should dismiss the complaint
when, on the evidence presented, the trial court would be bound to
acquit as a matter of law."
The Anderson case also contains the following language "the
prosecution is not required to introduce enough evidence to
establish the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must
present a quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant submission of
the case to the trier of fact."

Footnote 13 of that opinion

states that probable cause at a preliminary hearing is a higher
standard of "probable cause" than the "probable cause" for
arrest.

The Supreme Court reasoned, "thus, the minimum quantum of

evidence is more than required to establish probable cause for
arrest but less than would prove the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt."

Id, at 783.

The Anderson case has also been

cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in subsequent
opinions dealing with preliminary hearings, see State v. Easthope.
668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983) and State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah
1986).
ANALYSIS
At final argument of this case, the prosecution and defense
argued that the prosecution's case really hinged on the results of
the gunshot residue tests.

Without the gunshot residue test

results, the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to link
the defendant to the second degree murder charge.
The court is of the opinion that the gunshot residue tests in
this case are not reliable to provide that critical linkage.

Of

great significance, is the fact that the prosecution has tested
the defendant's workplace and found one particle "unique" as well
as many particle "characteristic" of gunshot residue. The
defendant was regularly employed in an environment in which
particles "unique" and "characteristic" of gunshot residue are
prevalent.

It is very conceivable that the defendant's hands had

particles "characteristic" of gunshot residue when tested by law
enforcement officers a few hours after work.

He works day after

day in an environment where these particles are prevalent.

No

evidence was presented to indicate that the workplace particles
would not be found on the defendant's hands a few hours after work.
Another fact of significance is that both of the defendant's
hands were tested and had particles "characteristic" of gunshot

residue upon them.
with both hands?

Did the defendant shoot the gun by holding it
It seems highly unlikely that the particles

could be found on both the defendant's hands and could have come
from the .22 caliber pistol.

The gun is not particularly large or

heavy and one which a person of the size and stature of the
defendant clearly would have no trouble holding, aiming and
shooting.

The .22 caliber gun was also a relatively "clean gun"

exuding comparatively little gunshot residue.

No one testified

about the possibility of the defendant shooting the gun with one
hand and particles "characteristic" of residue landing on the
other hand.

Furthermore, if the defendant really shot the gun,

why were only particles "characteristic" and not "unique" found on
his hands?

When Professor Gaskill tested the firing of the same

gun with the same ammunition, he found particles "unique" to
gunshot residue.

Finally, the most prevalent particles found at

the defendant's place of employment were also "characteristic"
particles.
For the above reasons, the court finds that a reasonable jury
could not link the defendant to the charge with the gunshot
residue test results.

They do not establish the probable cause

necessary to link the defendant to the commission of the offense.
The prosecution points out that Mary had no gunshot residue
on her hands when tested.

The argument is that if she

self-inflicted the gunshot, she would have had residue on her
bands.

In this case, she had none.

However, Kevin Smith

testified that he did not analyze all of the particles taken from
Mary's hands and therefore it was possible that Mary had gunshot
residue on her hands.

He also stated that a lack of gunshot

residue should not be conclusive that Mary did not fire the gun.

The defense also persuasively argues that Mary's hand did not
have gunshot residue when tested because it may have been nibbed
off in the hustle of the care that she received after she was
discovered with a gunshot wound.

The defendant was told by the

911 dispatcher to hold her hand and to turn her over. Mary's
upper clothing was removed—presumably robbing against her hands
and removing residue.

A bag was placed and taped over each hand

and later removed at the hospital (unfortunately

the bags were

not preserved by law enforcement to test for gunshot residue that
may have been displaced from the hands and still found within the
bags).

Mary's hands were moving about as she was taken on the

stretcher from the home while her hands were still in the bags.
Numerous persons were working upon and around Mary at the
hospital.

The scene was hectic as medical personnel attempted to

preserve her life. Mary's left chest was cut, tubes placed into
her chest and I.V.'s administered.

Blood also was on her hands.

Given these facts, it is very conceivable that any gunshot residue
from a relatively "clean gun" found on her hands would rub off or
be obliterated.
Nor is the court persuaded that the gun, if fired by Mary,
would exude a sufficient amount of gunshot residue on her hands to
be detectable.

The gun is a relatively "clean gun" exuding

comparatively little gunshot residue.

It is true that test

firings were performed under the direction of Professor Gaskill,
showing a discharge of gunshot residue.

But these tests were

presumably conducted with a person holding the .22 caliber gun

with the right hand holding the pistol in a normal manner—with
the heel of the gun held with the right hand and pulling the
trigger with the right index finger.

The shell would expend to

the right through the exit chamber and presumably most of the
gunshot residue would also be expelled through the exit chamber to
the right of the gun.

There was no testimony of gunshot residue

tests performed consistent with the defense theory that the gun
was held in Mary's right hand and pointed backwards and fired
using her right thumb.

In essence, the gun was held by her right

hand but on the left side of the gun—away from the exit chamber
which expels

the cartridge to the right and presumably also

expels most of the gunshot residue.
performed is obvious to the court.

The reason this test was not
However, appropriate testing

perhaps could have been performed in a safe manner. Regardless,
the evidence is not before the court and yet for the above
reasoning, the court doubts that the gun, if fired by Mary, would
exude a sufficient amount of gunshot residue to be easily
detectable on her hands, especially after receiving all of the
care and treatment which she received as described in the
preceding paragraph.
One of the defendant's first comments made to the 911
operator is consistent with the prosecution's case.

The defendant

stated "Oh...1...1...my girlfriend just shot herself."

It could

be considered, although not argued as such by the prosecution,
that this statement was the beginning of an admission changed in
mid-course by the defendant.

The statement, however, obviously

cannot provide the linkage of the defendant to the murder charge.
It was made in the confusion and excitement at the very beginning
of the 911 call.

It is not an admission and is consistent with

many other emotional, excited utterances made by the defendant
while on the telephone line with the 911 operator.

These

emotional, excited utterances are consistent with the defense
theory that Mary self-inflicted the gunshot wound.
stated,

"Oh God, I can't believe she done this."

The defendant
(sic) and "I

can't calm down but my girlfriend just shot herself."

and, in

speaking directly to Mary, "How could you do this?"
The prosecution also points to the fact that when Mary was
shot, her left arm was raised at least to shoulder level in a
natural reaction to protect herself from the gunshot.

However,

the court has viewed the evidence demonstrated by the mannequin
and determines that there would be no reason for Mary to raise her
left arm to protect herself from the gunshot.

The gun would have

been held by the defendant in a position too low and too close to
Mary's chest for Mary to raise her left arm above shoulder height
in any meaningful self defense.
However, the left arm being raised by Mary is more consistent
with a person who is self-inflicting a gunshot and chooses to
cover her eyes with her left hand rather than literally look down
the barrel of the gun as it was pointed at her chest, neck or
facial area.
Furthermore, the closeness of the gun when it was shot is an
important factor.

Nine inches away from Mary is clearly within

Mary's 26 1/2 inch arms reach.

It would seem that if Mary were to

be shot by the defendant that she would be shot at a distance out
of her arms reach.
Another factor to consider is the trajectory of the shot
itself.

The trajectory is very consistent with Mary holding the

gun up at herself with her right hand and pulling the trigger with
her right thumb.

The trajectory compared with the closeness of

the shot and Mary's elevated left arm is not consistent with the
prosecution's theory that the defendant held the gun and fired the
fatal shot.
Another factor is the location of the gun itself when the
police arrived at the home.

It was found on the floor between

Mary's legs—exactly where one would expect it to be found if the
gunshot were self-inflicted.

Furthermore, the officers observed

no evidence of any struggle when they were inside the home.
There is ample motive for Mary to have taken her own life.
She was distraught.

She was crying and upset.

She had just been

informed that she would have to leave the residence of Donald
Jaeger the next day and not continue to reside with him.
would she live?
whom?

Where

Under what circumstances would she live and with

She was under the influence of alcohol and Valium.

Earlier

in the evening she had temporarily abandoned her daughter at the
home unsupervised.

She had been confronted with making long

distance phone calls to places and to people unknown and not
approved by Donald Jaeger.

She spoke to her mother on the

telephone about her many problems and her troubled life and
expressed a desire to get away from things.

The combination of

these emotions and chemicals could very well have prompted Mary to
take her own life.

Of significance, is the first comment made by

Mary's mother, Judy Clark, when informed that Mary had died.

She

asked if Mary had taken her own life.
On the other hand, is there a motive for the defendant to
kill Mary?

It is true that this case is in a domestic environment

where strong and sometimes unpredictable emotions may exist.

It

is true that Mary made unauthorized phone calls, abandoned her
daughter at the defendants home unsupervised and had been at a bar
or a party that evening.
Valium in her system.

She came home late with alcohol and

The relationship was over.

When

relationships end, people are often excited and do not restrain
their anger and frustration.
person?

But was the defendant this type of

Was he excited and did he fail to restrain his anger and

frustration?

It is significant to the court that, in spite of all

that had happened and after the defendant had informed Mary that
the relationship was over, Donald Jaeger telephoned Maryfs mother,
Judy Clark.

He said that Mary needed to talk to her and then gave

Mary the phone.

This does not appear to be the conduct of a

person who would within minutes take Mary's life.
It is true that the opinion of the Assistant State Medical
Examiner was that Mary's death was a homicide.

However, his

opinion was grounded on the discredited gunshot residue tests and
he did not consider any factors of a possible suicide.

For these

important reasons and other, the court is not persuaded by the
opinion of the Assistant State Medical Examiner.

CONCLUSION
The court has taken this case under advisement for over a
three week period of time.

The court has reviewed the tapes of

the trial on many occasions as well as the 911 tape. The court
has examined the physical evidence that was admitted at trial
including the mannequin, the firearm, the photographs, and the
gunshot residue test packets.

This case is certainly one of the

most difficult cases that the court has been assigned to decide
during an eight year tenure on the bench.

The court has given

this case an extensive amount of careful thought and consideration.
The case is a circumstantial evidence case with major
weaknesses.

The facts just do not add up to the second degree

murder charge against the defendant.

The legal standard

articulated by our Supreme Court is a higher standard of probable
cause than the probable cause associated with arrest.

There is

not a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to submit
case to a judge or jury.

this

It is the finding of this court that if

a trial court were presented with this case that it would be bound
to acquit the defendant as a matter of law.

Could a reasonable

jury find the defendant guilty of the homicide charge?

This

court's honest evaluation of that question is negative—no
reasonable jury given the facts of this case before the court
could find the defendant guilty of second degree murder. The
court concludes that the requisite probable cause necessary for a

bindover at a preliminary hearing is lacking.

The case is

dismissed against the defendant and he is discharged.
Dated this 1st day of February, 1991.

Michael L. Hutchings^
Third Circuit Court Judge
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